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Are Human
Embryos One of Us?
An Exploration of Personhood

by James J. Rusthoven

You have searched me, Lord, and you know me. You know
when I sit and when I rise; you perceive my thoughts from
afar. You discern my going out and my lying down; you are
familiar with all my ways. (Psalm 139: 1-3)

T

he development of the human unborn has
been the subject of curiosity and awe since the time
of Hippocrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Despite over
two millennia of reflection about how the unborn
Dr. James Rusthoven, MD, MHSC (bioethics), is Professor
of Medical Oncology/Infectious Diseases at McMaster
University, in Hamilton, Ontario.
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should be looked upon by mature adult human beings, the status of ourselves during pre-birth development remains a divisive topic that gets to the
core of who we are as distinct creatures in God’s
created order. My objective in this paper is to explore notions of respect and personhood as they
have been applied to arguments for and against the
ethical appropriateness of producing and using human embryos for research purposes. I also hope
that my reflections will get the reader to think about
what to think about when considering the ethical issues created by procreative technologies.
During my master’s level studies in bioethics,
I came to realize that secular bioethics was largely
a process-driven discipline. Our main textbook forwarded a framework known by some as principlism,
which embodies four concepts: autonomy, benevolence, non-maleficence, and justice.1 The authors
themselves, each favoring very different utilitarian
and deontological ethical theories, proposed this
framework on the sincere belief that bioethicists
adhering to different ethical theories could use it
as a commonly understood language with which
to engage in eclectic bioethical discussions even if
they professed to very divergent beliefs, values, and
faiths. Their framework has become the backbone
of the dominant paradigm for decision-making in
biomedical ethics today.
During my studies I became frustrated, not
so much with the language being promulgated as
with the lack of a moral foundation upon which
the meaning of the language could be based.
While adamantly denying that this framework is a

theory (they prefer to describe their moral conceptualization as moral reflection and construction2),
the authors of principlism lapse into theory language
often enough to reveal the tension in addressing
bioethical issues with a common language that has
no common grounding. It is out of this experience that one can see the importance of exploring whether the Christian tradition, particularly
the Reformed tradition with its distinct reliance on
and interpretation of Scripture, could contribute to
a richer understanding of contemporary bioethical issues for the edification of both the Christian
community and its public witness.
In light of the widespread acceptance of in vitro
fertilization and the resulting ethical quandary of
what to do with its storehouse of left-over embryos, there continues to be a thriving debate over the
moral appropriateness of thawing frozen human
embryos or of creating new ones for the purpose
of using and necessarily destroying them for scientific purposes. The overriding incentive for many

A major focus for many
in this debate has been
the moral status of these
embryos, on which some
feel the moral justification
for creating and destroying
them rests.
researchers working in this area is the laudable goal
of finding novel treatments for afflictions such as
heart disease, type I diabetes, and Parkinson’s disease. A major focus for many in this debate has
been the moral status of these embryos, on which
some feel the moral justification for creating and
destroying them rests.
Two prominent concepts in this debate are
those of respect of the embryo and whether embryos are
persons. Karen Lebacqz, a bioethicist ordained in
the United Church of Christ, has been one of the
strongest advocates for respecting the embryo.

“Respect”, she writes, “is owed not simply to persons, but very precisely to those who are always in
danger of being cast outside the system of protection that personhood brings. In such an understanding, an embryo need not be a person to be
deserving of respect. Indeed, it may be precisely
because it is not considered a person that its value
needs more urgently to be upheld.”3 Lebacqz’s position comes out of a concept of personhood championed in the eighteenth century by Immanuel
Kant. According to Kant’s concept, a person has
self-determination and the defining quality of rational will. However, since this and other human
qualities are not inherently possessed by the embryo, Lebacqz tries to salvage some value toward
the embryo by attributing to it what she terms
“respect.” She states that the blastocyst (the early
stage of the embryo consisting of about 120 cells)
should not be treated cavalierly; instead, she speaks
of it positively as “an entity with incredible value;
as something precious that cannot be replaced by
any other blastocyst, whose existence is to be celebrated and whose loss is to be grieved.” Yet, on the
same page, she goes on to say that “such an entity
can be used in research and can even be killed. To
do so is not in itself disrespectful.”4
Lebacqz justifies such a position by appealing
to prima facie ethical duties, those duties which are
considered normally required but which can be
overridden in specific circumstances by other duties with the risk of leaving ethically difficult residual effects.5 Applied here, Labecqz says that harm
should be minimized if early embryos are to be
used for research. While preserving the life of the
embryo should take priority, this priority is only in
a context where it is possible to get the data from
dissected embryonic stem cells while still preserving the embryo. The implicit message seems clear:
while preserving the embryo is desired over killing
it, getting the data is the priority; and if the only
way to do so is to kill the embryo, so be it. She
says that respect for the embryo can be expressed
in the manner of killing, in the attitude expressed in
the act. Such respect is near the top of a hierarchy
of respect, which includes lesser degrees of respect
for animals and plants.
Christian ethicists Daniel Callahan and Gilbert
Meilaender, from Roman Catholic and Lutheran
Pro Rege—September 2007
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traditions, respectively, have countered that such
talk is an empty exercise and that any value of the
embryo has been stripped away in the absence of
criteria for determining how to weigh the value of
the embryo against the potential good of the research to which it is subjected.6 In her response,
ethicist Francoise Baylis quipped, “For certainly
something is very odd in claiming to cherish the
human embryo because of what it is while at the
same time planning for its destruction.”7
If the value of human embryos is thus based
on an intuitive concept called respect, as described
by Lebacqz, perhaps embryos are nothing more
than clumps of cells, exploitable for the biological
knowledge extracted as scientists see fit!
Before making such a judgment, however, we
should now look at the other concept on this debate: personhood. Several contemporary theologians,
most notably Oliver O’Donovan, have enriched
our understanding of personhood as it arose from
early Christian thought.8 During the fourth and
fifth centuries, debate raged in earnest on how to
best express the nature of Christ and his relationship with the Father and the Holy Spirit. In this
endeavor, our ancestors in the faith drew from
both Latin and Greek but found both languages
wanting in their efforts to express with scriptural
faithfulness the divine-ness and human-ness of
our Lord Jesus Christ. The Latin-speaking church
chose the word persona to capture the sense of
Christ’s essence. In the ancient theatre, the persona
was the character-mask. An actor played different
characters, each represented by a different mask.
Each character or persona became known through
its history within the story.9 But a problem arose
because the Latin word persona could not be easily translated conceptually into the language of the
Eastern contingent of the still universal church.
The closest Greek word for a mask or face, prosopon,
was deemed too hollow in its meaning. Therefore,
the Greek-speaking church came to use the richer
term hupostasis, or substance, which connoted a substantive reality that underlies or ties together the variable qualities and characteristics that an individual
may present. However, disagreement persisted despite efforts by leaders such as the Cappodocian
fathers of the Greek church, who pleaded, “We
shall in no way quarrel about the names, as long
10
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as the words point to the same notion.”10 (Due
in large part to similar efforts at linguistic rapprochement by Hilarius, bishop of Poitiers, and
other Latin fathers, this problem did not formally
split the Church, but confusion continued.) At
the same time, others were suggesting the more
qualitative notions of the Trinitarian personhood,
such as activity. For example, Apollinaris, fourthcentury bishop of Laodicea, suggested that Christ’s
identity be seen as self-conscious, action-directed mind;
that is, a human mind was replaced by a divine
mind embodied in human flesh.11 As we will see
shortly, such ideas foreshadowed the modern tendency to consider personhood as demonstrated
qualities, with major implications for contemporary decisions about the degree of human-ness to
which unborn, developing human beings may be
entitled. Even Augustine suggested that God’s
unity be compared with a human person and that
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit be compared with
three aspects of personality, such as memory, understanding, and will.12 Hendrikus Berkhof interprets Augustine as distinguishing three relations
within God rather than substantial distinctions.
Augustine also related the Trinity to love; that is,
the Father as the lover, the Son as the object of
love, and the Holy Spirit as the act of love.13
In 451, the Council of Chalcedon declared
that the Trinity consisted of three persons. Within
eighty years, Boethius (480 BC), dubbed by some as
the last of the Roman philosophers and first of the
scholastic theologians, wrote an essay in which he
attempted to better define nature and person. While
readily confessing that “the proper definition of
Person is a matter of very great perplexity,”14 he borrowed Aristotelian ideas of substance and corporality in defining a person as the individual substance
of a rational nature. In so doing, he acknowledged
the connotation of hupostasis as indicating a higher
value of substance than that of animals. Despite
such attempts at clarification, the idea of person
remained elusive for many. Anselm of Canterbury
was so distraught in using “three persons” to connote “three substances” that he spoke of “three
I do not know what” ; and no less than Thomas
Aquinas felt that “person” meant “relation” albeit
as “its own mode of being.”15 Furthermore, Jones
and others have suggested that, had Aquinas un-

derstood the intrinsic power of embryonic development as we do today, he would have judged that
human beings begin with the fusion of the sperm
and the egg. Thomistic principles also adhered to
Boethius’s definition, such that human beings were
considered persons in possessing a rational nature,
even though the unborn may be unable to exercise that reason.16 Boethius’s definition persisted,
though its original meaning and Christological basis subsequently became eroded. By the eighteenth
century, personhood had come to mean a particular instance of a rational nature, stripped of its substantive core. What was the secondary feature of
Boethius’s definition, rational nature, became the
primary feature. Put another way, the dominant
anthropology of Western culture had changed
from valuing humans for who they are to valuing
them for what they can do.
Unfortunately, Scripture does not directly, in so
many Greek or Hebrew words, tell us what personhood is or when personhood is achieved in human
development. As a result, many Christians have
turned to embryological and medical science for
clarity. Have these disciplines given us that clarity? We know now that the male and female contribution to the procreative process are cells, not
fluids or spirits or some other previously conceived
substances or forms, through which pagan and
Christian alike once envisioned that which could
not be seen. The union of those genetically different cells results in a third genetically distinct entity, which is not the sum of the parts but a unique
biological being, alive and progressing in a developmental direction, programmed yet environmentally-influenced to become a new creature. With
conception also begins a new history, a biological
and historical continuity, which grows, leaving a trail
of what it was and a prescription for what it can
become.17
Some would say, however, that the embryo and
the early fetus are simply biological beings, genetically human but without characteristics and qualities indicative of a functioning human being. In its
attempt to judge the severity of penance for harm
inflicted on the unborn, the medieval church appealed to Aristotelian distinctions, which differently valued so-called unformed and formed stages
of development (Aquinas adopted Aristotle’s claim

that complete formation of the organs occurs at 40
days from conception for males and 90 days for females. Ensoulment reputedly occurred at this time
as well18). From these roots developed qualitative
criteria for determining humanness and personhood. O’Donovan has referred to Kant’s practical
imperative as the prototype of the modern preference for qualitative conceptions.19 Picking up systematically where Boethius left off, Kant, whose
insights have shaped so much of contemporary

Unfortunately, in
efforts to counter the
impersonalization of the
Holy Spirit by modern
liberal theology, evangelicals
introduced the personality
of the Holy Spirit with the
modern connotations of an
autonomy of personality,
which further supported the
position of those who saw
human value in human
qualities and function.
humanist ethics, argued that the value of humanity
that is distinct and most prized above that of all
other creatures and objects of the temporal order
is the rational nature, which must respect itself. This
respect can be in the form of self-respect or respect
of other human beings. For Kant, it is the generic
rational nature that is the object of esteem, the objective end of our moral law, not the individual in which
it appears.
From this Kantian bend in the Western philosophical road also comes the concept of personality. Hendrikus Berkhof traces this from what he
calls a cult of “the person” arising out of the modPro Rege—September 2007

11

ernism of the late nineteenth century. This condenses, he says, to personality as autonomous and
self-conscious power with its own moral strength
and respect for itself.20 Unfortunately, in efforts to
counter the impersonalization of the Holy Spirit by
modern liberal theology, evangelicals introduced
the personality of the Holy Spirit with the modern
connotations of an autonomy of personality, which
further supported the position of those who saw
human value in human qualities and function.
Does such a concept of personhood as personality gain support from theologians in the
Reformed tradition? Generally not, but then personhood is not addressed in systematic way. As
mentioned earlier, Augustine was clearly unhappy
with the term persona and felt that the term fit better in describing the triune God than did what he
called the three relations within the Godhead. In
fact, says Berkhof, in general the Reformers were
not particularly interested in this terminological
heritage of the church. Calvin’s own stated preference of person as a subsistence in God’s essence,
related to the other persons but distinguished by an
incommunicable quality, could hardly be claimed as a
clarification of the matter.21,22 Kuyper saw the soul
of each individual as a unique creative act of God.
God creates the soul and the body in the embryo,
and human personality develops in the person that
is the union of body and soul. Beyond this, both
Kuyper and later Herman Bavinck acknowledged
the mystery of human individuality and of human
personhood in light of an immediate relationship
with God.23
Gene Outka, in his comprehensive exploration
of the meaning of agape love in the Christian life,
sees a person as an object of concern, of reverence,
with acknowledged value as a person and with whom
personal involvement is desired. Agape is the attitude toward such a person, and such a concept of
person is independent of particular qualities and
behavior tendencies. We acknowledge value in a
fellow human being; we do not, or should not, bestow value on a neighbor.24
Gordon Spykman has written that Western
dualistic anthropologies lead to insuperable dilemmas in addressing the issue of abortion. If one
posits a separation of some sort between body
and soul, says Spykman, then the problem arises:
12
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During which trimester does the fetus become a
person? He states that “For a biblical view of man,
human life in the integrally coherent unity of its
bodily-spiritual wholeness begins embryonically at
conception….For a divinely bestowed sanctity is
insinuated into the total fabric of human life from
its sunset years all the way back to its inception.”25
In his study of humans as the image of God,
Anthony Hoekema argues that humankind’s
unique value is tied to the post-Fall retention of the
image of God. This view is supported by references such Genesis 9:6, which describes the violence
done to God’s image if human blood is shed by another human.26 This creationally endowed aspect
of our creatureliness provides one of the strongest
supports for inherent human value, which may be
described as personhood.
Today, many Christians and non-Christians
have chosen to adopt a concept of person whose
meaning and essence is defined by attributes, without which a human may no longer be conceived
of as a person. As Margaret Summerville recently
suggested, we seem to have become human doings instead of human beings.27 And, by this way
of thinking, the attributes most valued and most
often associated with personality and thus with
person appear to emanate from brain tissue, from
whence originates rationality and spiritual possibilities.28 From this concept follow two perceptions
that affect a prevalent attitude regarding human
embryos: a conviction that human personality can
be the object of experimental knowledge and that
humanness can be typed accordingly into person,
non-person, or pre-person. Seeing this conviction
in the light of the liberal scientific value of getting
control of ourselves, we conclude that our biological way of being goes from that which we live
to that which we observe and, ultimately, to that
which we conquer in an effort to achieve human
self-transcendence.
What is meant by self-transcendence? While
the transcendence of God, in the traditional
Christian sense, alludes to God’s providential mastery over all that is created, self-transcendence, in
a temporally restricted sense, refers to the human
subordination of material reality toward higher or
spiritual ends. Using Calvin’s metaphor, as applied
to science through materialistic spectacles, human

beings subject material objects to experimental
scrutiny for the exploitative purpose of asserting themselves transcendently over those objects
through the knowledge obtained. In the absence
of a relationship with God, however, the human
spirit is elusive, trying to grow with knowledge to
become the subject of the science itself, the spirit
of the resultant knowledge. Paradoxically, however, in scientifically studying ourselves as objects,
we cannot see ourselves as a whole. Consequently,
the part of us that is spirit is withdrawn from such
scientific study and becomes elusive. O’Donovan
suggests that our fascination with the study of the
brain is one attempt to tie down spirit to its presumed material substrate and that doing so allows
us to assert our transcendence over it. 29
In applying this idea to embryo experimentation, the tension thus arises wherein the embryo
is human like us yet is considered an appropriate

. . . a Reformed
interpretation of the postFall image of God supports
human personhood as an
inherent essence of who we
are, apart from the qualities
and gifts given to us by
God’s gracious providence.
object of experimentation because it seems to be
devoid of the attributes that make up personality,
which expresses the human spirit. The embryo becomes, in effect, undifferentiated humanity, from
which spirit and personality have not yet arisen
from the biological substrate. Human embryos
then become experimental projects of self-mastery,
for the purpose of exploration and exploitation,
rather than objects of human love. The human
embryo itself becomes ambiguous: it is ourselves
yet not ourselves. These members of our own
species become negatively special because they are not

meant to become objects of our love and compassion. Indeed, such language begins to have overtones of the respect of which Karen Lebaczq speaks,
in the quest to impart value and meaning to embryos. That which we have made in the laboratory,
rather than begotten, is now at our disposal rather
than someone to be engaged in a nurturing and anticipatory fellowship. Is this the way we should be?
Is self-transcendence by experimental knowledge
the telos, the ultimate good for humankind?
At the level of embryology, there are, in my
judgment, no developmental biological milestones
that separate the person from the non-person.
When I am confronted with the suggestion that
implantation onto the wall of the uterus signals the
first time an embryo becomes a person because it
has its own blood supply distinct from that of its
mother, I point out that human cancers also develop their own blood supply when they get to a
certain stage. The same biological principle seems
to hold for both. When the inner cells of a growing cell cluster can no longer survive simply by osmotic diffusion of nutrients from its surroundings,
genes encoded to produce and secrete vascular
growth factors are activated, and a nutritive vascular plumbing is generated. Does that biological
necessity change the valuation of a human cancer?
Indeed, is it transformed into a distinct person or a
clone of the person for which it now competes for
nutrients? I think not.
Similarly, at the psychological level, emotive
stimuli have been forwarded as grounds for conferring personhood. In their book How Now Shall
We Live, Chuck Colson and Nancy Pearcey relate
the story of the abortionist Bernard Nathanson.
As a technically skilled obstetrician in a thriving
abortion clinic, Nathanson kept himself aloof
from the human side of the plight of his unborn
patients. With the advent of ultrasound, he now
saw the features of the fetus in real time animation,
and, as Colson and Pearcey put it, the medical facts
now coalesced with the grainy image on the screen
and crashed into Nathanson’s consciousness.30 A
human being was in front of him and would soon
be destroyed. It was an epiphanal moment for him.
But images of flailing projections destined to become appendages are one thing. What about the
embryo? It lacks such humanoid qualities. It is
Pro Rege—September 2007
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a speck, like a poppy seed or, using a biblical image of the kingdom of God on earth, a growing
mustard seed. If one saw it under a video microscope powerful enough to see cytoplasm moving
or chromosomes parting to form two new pluripotent cells of the growing organism, would that
conjure up images sufficient to “crash into one’s
consciousness”? Is the value in the embryo, or is
the value to be bestowed on the embryo?
Let’s sum up for a moment some major points.
First, there seem to be no developmental stages that
signify the appearance of increasing human value
during pre-birth development. Second, the prevalent modern concept of personhood in our culture
views human beings as persons by virtue of their
qualities and capacities rather than through inherent worth. This concept excludes early developing
human beings from consideration as persons, leaving them vulnerable to treatment deemed criminal against more mature human beings. Third, a
Reformed interpretation of the post-Fall image of
God supports human personhood as an inherent
essence of who we are, apart from the qualities and
gifts given to us by God’s gracious providence. But
how is our personhood, so conceived, fully realized.
If it is not realized through matured qualities and
attributes, then through what, or whom? Recall
that both Kuyper and Bavinck acknowledged the
mystery of human individuality and of human personhood preserved in an immediate relation with
God, a mystery which Berkouwer said no science
or theology can unveil for us.31
Is it this mystery that we are trying to overcome
in our pursuit of biological knowledge? Is mystery a confession of ignorance, a lack of control,
the inability to capitalize on the greatest number
of choices that full biological knowledge can offer?
If one thinks about it, the loss of mystery predictably puts us into a tailspin of reductionism such
that what we grab onto and think we understand
as knowledge becomes more than it really is. It becomes the key to unlocking the mystery and comes
to stand for all that is important to know about an
object or organism. Not just biological mystery but
then all mystery becomes lost, and with that loss,
our self-transcendence fills the void.
Could God have created us so that mystery
would be a normative part of our existence and of
14
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our understanding of our relationship to Him? In
Eden we disobeyed God in an effort to self-transcend, to know good from evil, to be like God.
We paid for it then with our lives.32 Some today
plead for humility to maintain a sense of mystery
and of a budding relationship with even the youngest of the unborn. Bouma and his colleagues have
adopted a covenantal view, through which they
suggest attention should move away from whether
unborn human beings image God toward whether
those with responsibility to protect and nurture
the vulnerable among us are doing so.33 Gilbert
Meilaender writes, “We need the virtue of humility
before the mystery of human personhood and the
succession of generations.”34 He sees the unborn as
“simply the weakest and most needy members of our
community”(his emphasis).35 He encourages an
unconditional commitment to parenthood to the
unseen unborn, wherein “The time of pregnancy
will be better spent learning to love the child we
have been given before we begin to evaluate and
assess the child’s capacities.”36 This disposition
has been expressed recently in a poignant expression of wonder, anticipation, and ultimately grief,
by William Nathan Sneller in the November 2006
edition of The Banner. He shares with us the loss of
their one-month-old, unborn human being, whom
he referred to as their child: “He was not our miscarriage; he was our child...[;]we quickly overlook
those God knows only in the womb.”37 Indeed,
what about those who are conceived in a Petri dish
and never see a womb?
I think that we need to retain the sense of awe,
fear, humility, and contriteness that mystery inspires. Reformed ethicist Allen Verhey speaks of
mystery in a creational sense and of God as the
Ultimate Mystery:
		 We live in God’s world, and we encounter
mystery. Mystery evokes among us sense of its
presence and power. Mystery evokes a sense of
dependence upon some dimly known but reliable
order, a sense of gratitude for the givenness (the
gifts) of life and health…and it evokes a keen sense
of responsibility to the inscrutable Mystery [that
is, God,] who sustains the order, gives the gifts,
judges the flaw, and promises hope.38

And regarding the consequences of losing this

sense of mystery he notes,
When, in teaching the young, we empty the
world of wonder, when we eliminate mystery in
our quest for mastery, then we distort their vision
and their lives….Christians sometimes respond
to the mystery by reducing God to a giant puzzle
or by attempting to domesticate God, rendering
the inscrutable not only scrutable but serviceable
to their own projects, to their own individual or
communal causes.39

Finally, we hear Paul Ramsey, in his book
Fabricated Man:
		 Men may be able to subdue the mystery of
procreation, they may be able to subdue all the
wonders of human sexual response, in their sciences. But they cannot subdue the mystery in the
fact that eminently human communications of
marital love are also the places where we engage
as pro-creators, and establish the step into cov-

Could God have created
us so that mystery would
be a normative part of
our existence and of our
understanding of our
relationship to Him?
enant parenthood. Men can only deny that there
is any mystery to be honored here; they can only
reduce the matter to an accident of biological nature that could as well not have been so, or could
be changed to vegetative reproduction.40

In its fullest, uncorrupted expression, personhood encompasses the covenantal relationship
with God the Creator, a relationship badly distorted by sin yet renewed and sustained by grace.
We need to think humbly and think hard about
what we are doing when we begin to make some-

thing that would otherwise be begotten. Do we need
the embryo as the basis of cellular therapies for
some diseases? Can we redirect our financial and
human resources toward therapies that can be derived from other stem cells that are not genetically
unique beings, do not come into being through
conception, and are not meant by their very nature to be the objects of love as distinct creatures?
Christian communities remain divided on this and
other bioethical issues. They need to persevere,
not capitulate, in their prayerful desire for insight,
deliberation, and discernment; test the spirits faithfully; and distinguish that which is Holy and that
which is not.
While Scripture may not speak directly and
precisely to many of our current ethical concerns,
it does teach us to be always in awe of our God
who made us and knew us intimately as unborn.
In Psalm 51 we read, “Surely, I was sinful from the
time my mother conceived me.” In Jeremiah 1:5,
the word of the Lord calls out, “Before I formed
you in the womb I knew you, before you were born
I set you apart; I appointed you as a prophet to the
nations.” And in his perplexed anguish, Job calls
out, “Did you not pour me out like milk and curdle
me like cheese, clothe me with skin and flesh and
knot me together with bones and sinews? You gave
me life and showed me kindness….” But perhaps
Psalm 139: 13-16, 23, 24, continued from the beginning of this paper, gives us the true spirit of the
intimacy of our relationship to God at all times:
		 For you created my inmost being; you knit me
together in my mother’s womb. I praise you because I am fearfully and wonderfully made; your
works are wonderful, I know that full well. My
frame was not hidden from you when I was made
in the secret place. When I was woven together
in the depths of the earth, your eyes saw my unformed body. All the days ordained for me were
written in your book before one of them came to
be…Search me, God, and know my heart; test me
and know my anxious thoughts. See if there is any
offensive way in me and lead me in the way everlasting.

Thus says the Lord.
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